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Encryption June 26, 2026 • 4 min read

Face ID for Your Prayer Journal

Biometric unlock just shipped in Praying: open the app, glance at your phone (or touch the sensor), and your encrypted journal unlocks. No password typing.

Whenever a privacy-focused app adds a convenience feature, you should ask what it costs. So here's the honest, no-hand-waving explanation of what Face ID does in Praying — and, just as importantly, what it doesn't.

First, a quick recap of how your journal is locked

Everything you write in Praying is encrypted with AES-256-GCM before it leaves your device. The key that unlocks it is derived from your account password (PBKDF2, 600,000 iterations) — on your device, never on our servers. We store only ciphertext and wrapped keys. That's the zero-knowledge design, and nothing about it changed this week.

The practical consequence: your device needs your key in hand to decrypt your journal. Before biometric unlock, that meant typing your password whenever the app needed to re-establish it. Secure, but enough friction that some people were tempted toward shorter passwords — which is the one thing you should never weaken, because your password is your encryption.

What Face ID actually does

When you enable biometric unlock, your device caches your already-derived key in the operating system's keychain — the hardware-backed secure storage built into iOS and Android — and marks it as retrievable only after a successful biometric check.

So the sequence is:

  1. You sign in once with your password; your key is derived on-device
  2. The key is stored in the OS keychain, gated behind biometrics
  3. Next time you open the app, Face ID or your fingerprint releases the cached key
  4. Your journal decrypts locally, same as always

Notice what's not in that list: your face. Face ID and fingerprint data never leave your device and are never available to apps — that's an operating-system guarantee, enforced in hardware. Praying never sees your biometrics; it only learns "the OS says this is the owner" and receives the key it cached earlier.

Your password is still the master key

This is the part to hold onto: biometrics gate the cached key; they don't replace the password. Your password remains the root of your encryption. If Face ID fails — you're wearing a mask, the sensor misreads, or the OS decides to be cautious after a restart — you fall back to typing your password, and everything works exactly as before. Disable biometrics anytime in Settings and the cached key is discarded; you're back to password-only.

It also means biometric unlock changes nothing about account recovery. Lose your device and your data is still recoverable with your password (or your one-time recovery code) on a new device — and still unreadable to anyone who has the old one.

Why this beats an app-level PIN

Plenty of journaling apps offer a 4-digit PIN screen. It feels similar. It isn't:

A PIN screen is a curtain, not a lock. In most apps, the data behind it sits decrypted on disk; the PIN just hides the UI. Bypass the screen and the data is right there.

Our gate is enforced by the OS and hardware, not by app code. The key is unreadable until the secure hardware verifies you — the same mechanism protecting your banking app and your phone's own passcode.

Four digits is 10,000 guesses. Your password, stretched through 600,000 PBKDF2 iterations, is not.

The point of all this

Security that's annoying gets turned off. The goal of biometric unlock is to make the private thing also the easy thing — so the journal you trust with your most honest prayers is one glance away, every morning, without a single compromise to the encryption underneath.

Convenience features should never quietly weaken the lock. This one doesn't — and now you know exactly why.

See exactly how it works

Step-by-step encryption walkthrough, from password to ciphertext.

How Our Encryption Works